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BUSH V. GORE: REPLY TO FRIEDMAN 
RICHARD A. POSNER* 
 The litigation that followed the election deadlock in Florida last 
year and that culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. 
Gore1 has triggered an avalanche of scholarly commentary, almost all 
highly critical of the decision. Professor Friedman’s article2 is one of 
the most scholarly and temperate of the articles that I have read 
which criticize the decision. 
 I appreciate the force of his criticisms of my book,3 which defends 
the decision, though not the reasoning by which the majority of the 
Court reached it. I will respond to these criticisms in this brief com-
ment, following essentially the order of discussion in his article. The 
comment is not self-contained but presupposes familiarity both with 
my book and with Friedman’s article. 
 I want at the outset to dispel any impression which my comment 
may create that I consider my position on the merits of Bush v. Gore 
“right” and Professor Friedman’s “wrong.” Such terms are inapplica-
ble to the most difficult constitutional cases, of which Bush v. Gore (I 
think Friedman agrees) is one. I go no further than to claim that the 
decision (not, to repeat, the majority opinion) was reasonable. I also 
agree with much of Friedman’s analysis, but will not discuss the ar-
eas of agreement. 
 Friedman puts a great deal of weight on an interpretation of sec-
tion 2 of the Electoral Count Act4 as barring the appointment by the 
state legislature of a slate of presidential electors merely because the 
election is deadlocked. This is important because the worst-case sce-
nario that I sketch in my book and that provides the basis for my be-
lief that the Supreme Court’s decision terminating the deadlock was 
pragmatically justified pivots on the likelihood that the Florida Leg-
islature would have appointed a Bush slate had the Florida Supreme 
Court declared Gore the winner of the Florida popular vote. Section 2 
provides that if the popular election (or whatever other mode the 
state’s election law may specify for the appointment of the state’s 
presidential electors) “fail[s] to make a choice” of electors on election 
day (November 7 in 2000), the state legislature may select them.5 
                                                                                                                    
 * Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School. 
 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
 2. Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 811 (2001). 
 3. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2001). 
 4. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). 
 5. Id.  
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Friedman is right to point out that uncertainty about what choice 
was made is consistent with having made a choice. But what if De-
cember 18 (in 2000, the day on which the Electoral College was to 
vote—and note that the Constitution requires that all the electoral 
votes be cast on the same day6) had rolled around and the winner of 
the popular election had not yet been determined? That was a likely 
eventuality given the time required to conduct a statewide recount 
and to submit the results to judicial review. Would that eventuality, 
had it materialized, not have been a failure to choose the state’s elec-
tors, since it would mean7 that Florida would not be represented in 
the Electoral College? And, if so, wasn’t the state legislature entitled 
to appoint, at least tentatively, a slate of electors against the contin-
gency that on December 18 the deadlock would still be unresolved? I 
consider this an appropriate interpretation of section 2. Is it the 
“right” interpretation? Who knows? But it is sufficiently plausible to 
have set the stage for a face-off in Congress on January 6 (the date of 
the counting of the electoral votes) on whether the slate appointed by 
the legislature or the slate certified by the state’s supreme court was 
the legitimate one. And then the worst-case scenario would unfold as 
I described it in my book. 
 Friedman argues that there is no absolute requirement that a 
state’s electoral votes, to be counted, must be certified by December 
18.8 So the fact that that day arrived with no resolution of the elec-
toral deadlock by the Florida Supreme Court need not have excluded 
Florida from participating in the selection of the President by the 
Electoral College. But I am not sure what follows from this sugges-
tion. One possibility would be that, on December 18, Florida would 
vote the Bush slate on the ground that pending completion of the re-
count he was the presumptive winner of the popular election. But 
suppose that between December 18 and January 6, Gore had been 
declared the winner of the Florida popular election. Would Florida 
then recast its electoral votes? But the Constitution requires that all 
electoral votes be cast the same day. A voter who fails to vote on elec-
tion day is not allowed to vote later. To skirt this problem, Florida 
might ask each slate of electors to vote on December 18, leaving to 
Congress the decision which votes to count. But this of course as-
sumes that the deadlock must be resolved by Congress, and that is 
precisely the worst-case scenario that I sketch in my book. 
 So far I have been considering whether Bush v. Gore really did 
head off a fight in Congress to determine the next President. Now let 
me turn to the question whether, as a matter of doctrine rather than 
                                                                                                                    
 6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
 7. Subject to a qualification discussed shortly. 
 8. Friedman, supra note 2, at 819-21.  
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consequences, the Florida Supreme Court violated the “manner di-
rected” clause of Article II. (I agree that it did not violate the equal 
protection clause.) I accept Friedman’s test: “[u]nless the principles 
applied by the court amount to a clearly implausible construction of 
state law as the law stood on Election Day, there should not be an 
Article II problem.”9 
 Friedman attributes to me the view that “a punch-card ballot 
without a hole for a single presidential candidate punched cleanly 
through, knocking the chad off, does not properly cast a vote for 
President.”10 He bases this attribution on a statement in the statisti-
cal chapter of my book (chapter 2); it was not intended as a state-
ment of law, and indeed all I said there was that this interpretation 
made the best fit with the ordinary meaning of “error in the vote 
tabulation,” the relevant statutory phrase.11 My position was and is 
that because this is a permissible interpretation, one that does no 
violence to the statute, common sense, or precedent,12 its adoption by 
the state’s division of elections should, under Florida law, have been 
conclusive on the courts. The state’s election statute expressly dele-
gates responsibility for interpretation of the statute to the state elec-
tion officials; and when an agency given such a responsibility exer-
cises it reasonably, then under normal principles of administrative 
law obtaining in Florida as elsewhere that is the end of the judicial 
inquiry.13 I thus have no quarrel with Friedman’s statement that un-
der Florida law “[i]f a statute leaves room for a range of reasonable 
constructions, then the courts should ordinarily defer to a choice 
within that range made by the administrative entity charged with 
implementing the statute.”14 
 Deference to administrative judgment is particularly indicated 
where a sensible decision depends on considerations that are likely to 
be known better by the administrative officials and staff than by 
judges and (what is not quite the same thing) that are difficult to 
weigh and compare by the methods of litigation.15 Both conditions 
were met here. The question how much time and effort to invest in 
trying to recover votes from voter-spoiled ballots, in the context of 
looming deadlines for the selection of the state’s Electoral College 
                                                                                                                    
 9. Friedman, supra note 2, at 841. I don’t see, however, how this squares with his 
later statement that “to constitute a violation of Article II it is not enough that the state 
supreme court’s decision be wrong, or even obviously wrong and wrongheaded.” Id. at 857 
(emphasis added). 
 10. Id. at 843. 
 11. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (2000), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42, at 151-52. 
 12. The last point is the most debatable, and is discussed below. 
 13. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 100. 
 14. Friedman, supra note 2, at 851. 
 15. This too Friedman acknowledges as a principle of Florida law. Id. at 851 nn.157-
58. 
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winner, is not a question that judges have a comparative advantage 
in answering. It depends on subquestions such as how trustworthy 
the methods for inspecting spoiled ballots for ascertainable voter 
choice are, how trustworthy the local election boards that will con-
duct the inspection are, how long a hand recount will take, how likely 
the recount will be to change the outcome of the election, and the 
significance to be attached to the clarity and completeness of instruc-
tions that the voter was given by the local election boards (that is, 
how culpable in the spoilage of the ballot the voter should be 
thought). The ascertainment and weighing up of these factors require 
a managerial-style judgment in a field (election administration) 
which most judges have only fleeting, episodic contact with and no 
real expertise in, rather than the resolution of the kind of clean-cut 
issue of statutory interpretation or application with which judges are 
comfortable. 
 Moreover, although the interpretation adopted by the state elec-
tion officials was not compelled by the language of the statute (inter-
pretations rarely are), it was more consistent with that language 
than the interpretation adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in its 
November 21 decision, which required that all spoiled ballots (or at 
least all undervoted ballots) be counted if the voter’s intent could be 
ascertained. Remember that the operative statutory language was 
“error in the vote tabulation”16; without that, there is no legal basis 
for a full hand recount in the protest phase of an election dispute. 
Tabulation means counting, and the counting is done by machines, 
and if the machines are properly programmed, maintained, and op-
erated, and fail to record a vote only because the ballot was not 
marked properly by the voter, it is hard to see the failure to record as 
a tabulating error. Professor Friedman’s argument that the real 
statutory standard is “clear indication of the intent of the voter,”17 
because that is the standard applicable to damaged or defective bal-
lots, is strained. There is a clear distinction between a damaged or 
defective ballot on the one hand and a ballot that the voter has 
spoiled: namely that the voter is not complicit in the first type of 
screw-up. State election officials should be entitled to confine the in-
tent standard to the subset of screw-ups in which the voter is least at 
fault. That is precisely the kind of practical, splitting-the-difference 
resolution that, in the absence of a clear statutory directive, is best 
left to the judgment of the administering agency. 
 Now if Friedman is correct that, despite all I have said, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court had prior to the 2000 election carved out a special 
                                                                                                                    
 16. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 17. Friedman, supra note 2, at 847 (citing Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257 (Fla. 
2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)).  
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exception from the normal principles of administrative law for elec-
tion disputes, that special exception would constitute a valid judicial 
gloss on the state election statute. And he is right that there are 
cases which indicate that spoiled ballots should be counted as votes if 
the voter’s intent is discernible. But he is putting a lot of weight on 
dicta. All but two of the cases are ones in which the court was refus-
ing to set aside the result of an election.18 They are realistically 
viewed as based not on a careful analysis of the statute but on a 
natural reluctance to upset the results of an election, establishing a 
presumption that if applied to the 2000 election deadlock they would 
have required deferring to the position taken by the state election of-
ficials, who sought to ratify the popular vote. The other two cases 
date from 1917 and 1929, respectively.  In the earlier case the refusal 
to count certain ballots was deemed unlawful because the ballots did 
not violate any mandatory provision of the election code,19 and in the 
later case an election was set aside because the ballots had been im-
properly completed by the voter.20 
 I thus emphatically disagree with Professor Friedman’s conten-
tion that the officials’ “interpretation was clearly wrong or at least 
unreasonable, and beyond the bounds within which deference was 
required.”21 I also disagree that the Florida Supreme “court’s Novem-
ber 21 decision to extend the [canvassing] boards’ deadline had little 
impact on its December 8 decision to order a statewide recount.”22 
What was critical about the November 21 decision was not the exten-
sion but the ruling, carried through to the December 8 decision, that 
spoiled ballots must be counted if the voter’s intent is discernible. 
Had it not been for that ruling, there would have been no basis for 
ordering a statewide recount, since it was only the large number of 
spoiled ballots that cast doubt on whether Bush had really won the 
popular election. 
 Professor Friedman expresses doubt as to whether the election 
deadlock was even justiciable in the U.S. Supreme Court, given that 
the Constitution commits the counting of the electoral votes to Con-
gress without setting forth any standard for how disputes over the 
                                                                                                                    
 18. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 107 n.29 (the Boardman and Carpenter cases cited 
by Friedman, supra note 2, at 848 n.146, plus several other cases not cited by him). 
 19. Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 75 So. 411, 412 (Fla. 1917) (per curiam). Not all 
the instructions given voters are intended to state legal requirements. See POSNER, supra 
note 3, at 107 n.29. In Darby, a bond referendum case, two voters had marked their “X” to 
the right of the proposition to be voted on rather than the left, as the instructions required. 
Darby, 75 So. at 412. The votes were counted by hand—this was before machine count-
ing—and there was no rational basis for the rejection of the two ballots in question. The 
idea that a decision like Darby (setting its antiquity to one side) would require state elec-
tion officials to permit the counting of dimpled chads as votes is fanciful. 
 20. Florida ex rel. Nuccio v. Williams, 120 So. 310, 315 (Fla. 1929) (en banc). 
 21. Friedman, supra note 2, at 852. 
 22. Id. at 854. 
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validity of electoral votes cast on Electoral College election day are to 
be resolved. I agree that a dispute over electoral votes presents a “po-
litical question” that the Court should refuse to answer.23 But rather 
than showing that the Court should not have agreed to review the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in the litigation over the dead-
locked Florida election, this point demonstrates the opposite. Once 
the dispute landed in Congress on January 6, it would be too late for 
judicial intervention to resolve the dispute; that is one of the things 
that makes the worst-case scenario plausible. But before the dispute 
landed in Congress, when the issue was not how Congress would re-
solve a dispute over electors but the consistency of the Florida court’s 
decisions with the U.S. Constitution, there was no “textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politi-
cal department.”24 Nowhere does the Constitution suggest that Con-
gress shall resolve disputes over the application of Article II or any 
other provision of the Constitution to the selection of a state’s presi-
dential electors, a process that takes place before the electoral votes 
are counted. Congress is not “clearly the forum that the Constitution 
chose to resolve these disputes.”25 
 Professor Friedman devotes a fair bit of space to discussing the 
likely resolution of the deadlock had a Gore slate been approved by 
the Florida Supreme Court by December 12. I believe there is no rea-
sonable possibility that the statewide recount ordered by that court 
on December 8 could have been completed in four days with full ex-
haustion of judicial remedies. And so the dispute would have been 
tossed into the lap of Congress after all—there to be resolved, in 
Friedman’s words, by “open politics.”26 The intended force of “open” is 
unclear. Does it mean naked? Raw? Patently partisan? Or perhaps 
democratic? Experience with past presidential elections not resolved 
in the orthodox manner, namely 1800 (Jefferson over Burr), 1824 
(John Quincy Adams over Jackson), and 1876 (Hayes over Tilden) 
suggests that when the President is selected in an unorthodox way 
(by the House of Representatives, in the first two examples, and by 
an ad hoc commission appointed by Congress, in the third), he comes 
into office trailing poison. (The Hamilton-Burr duel may have been a 
consequence of the 1800 election foul-up, as Hamilton vigorously 
supported Jefferson, his traditional foe, against Burr.27) 
                                                                                                                    
 23. POSNER, supra note 3, at 184-85. 
 24. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 (1962) (quoted in Friedman, supra note 2, at 
859). 
 25. Contra Friedman, supra note 2, at 868 (“Congress is clearly the forum that the 
Constitution chose to resolve these disputes.”). 
 26. Id. at 867. 
 27. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 40-43 
(2000). 
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 And finally, I do not think that the Supreme Court’s intervention, 
ham-handed though it unquestionably was (for which Gore is to 
blame for not having accepted the result of the popular election in 
Florida), imposed a significant “cost to democracy.”28 It did damage 
the prestige (or, if one prefers, the “credibility”) of the Supreme 
Court, but as the Court is not a democratic institution, but a republi-
can check on democratic ardor and abuse, I do not see such damage 
as a setback for democracy. I don’t see what other democratic cost 
was incurred, unless one doubts, as I do not, that the outcome of the 
popular election was an unbreakable statistical tie. The recount or-
dered by the Florida Supreme Court, if carried through to the end, 
might have changed the result of the election; it would not have re-
vealed the “true” winner.29 And, on the other side, on the benefit side 
of the Court’s intervention, the “order and unity” side that Friedman 
mentions briefly, I disagree that dumping the deadlock into Congress 
would not have led to “even a delay in inauguration.”30 If Congress 
did not resolve the deadlock within two weeks, that is, by January 
20, an Acting President would have been appointed—but not, I take 
it, inaugurated. 
                                                                                                                    
 28. Friedman, supra note 2, at 868. 
 29. POSNER, supra note 3, at 88-90. 
 30. Friedman, supra note 2, at 868. 
